RANGKUMAN

LOKAKARYA NASIONAL HAK ASASI MANUSIA VII

”QUO VADIS PEMAJUAN DAN PENEGAKAN HAM DI INDONESIA”

Lokakarya nasional hak asasi manusia secara tradisional merupakan kegiatan tahunan Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, untuk melihat kembali perkembangan hak asasi dan menentukan langkah lebih lanjut. Lokakarya yang berlangsung pada tanggal 8 – 11 Juli 2008 ini dilakukan bekerjasama dengan Legal Development Facility Australia, dengan mengambil tempat di Jakarta dan diikuti oleh sekitar 150 peserta, mewakili organisasi pemerintah (nasional maupun lokal), akademisi, media, non-pemerintah dan perorangan. Lokakarya diawali oleh sambuta ketua Komnas HAM dan dibuka secara resmi oleh wakil presiden. Pembukaan ini dilanjutkan dengan keynote speech oleh Ketua Mahkamah Konstitusi.

Lokakarya mengambil tema ”10 tahun reformasi: Quo Vadis pemajuan dan penegakan hak asasi di Indonesia”; yang secara khusus hendak merefleksikan perjalanan pemajuan dan perlindungan hak asasi manusia di Indonesia sejak jatuhnya pemerintahan otoriter Soeharto. Perbincangan dilakukan dalam pertemuan pleno dan dilanjutkan dengan pembahasan dalam dua sub-tema besar. Subtema pertama menyangkut refleksi atas ‘Hak Ekonomi, Sosial dan Budaya Sebagai Landasan Penegakan Keadilan Sosial: 10 tahun reformasi’ dan sub-tema kedua refleksi atas “Pelaksanaan Hak Sipil dan Politik: 10 tahun reformasi’. Masing-masing subtema ini dibicarakan lebih intensif dalam sidang pleno secara berseri yang menghadirkan panelis sesuai keahlian dan atau pengalamannya dan dilanjutkan dalam sesi-sesi terfokus. Sesi-sesi terfokus subtema pertama mencakup (1) “Problem dan tantangan terhadap akses atas hak ekonomi, sosial dan budaya”, (2) “Problem dan tantangan dalam pelaku pelaksanaan hak ekonomi, sosial dan budaya, (3) “Problem dan tantangan hak ekonomi, sosial budaya dari perspektif korban”. Subtema kedua juga dipanelkan dalam empat sesi yang masing-masing membicarakan (1) pelaksanaan kebebasan beragama, (2) hak asasi manusia dengan kebijakan pertahanan dan keamanan dan (3) praktek-praktek penyiksaan dan bentuk-bentuk hukuman dan pelakuan yang kejam, tidak manusiawi dan merendahkan martabat manusia dan (4) Penyelesaian pelanggaran HAM masa lalu.

Diskusi dalam sesi terfokus mengelaborasi perbincangan dari diskusi panel, yang secara khusus memetakan perkembangan dan tantangan hak asasi serta agenda-agenda hak asasi ke depan. Hasil perbincangan dirangkum dalam paragraf-paragraf (1) Gambaran Umum Hak Asasi dan Demokrasi di Indonesia, (2) Keadaan dan Tantangan Hak-hak Ekonomi, Sosial dan Budaya di Indonesia dan (3) Keadaan dan Tantangan Hak-hak Sipil dan Politik.

1. Hak Asasi dan Demokrasi di Indonesia

Dari sudut standard setting sepuluh tahun terakhir menunjukkan kemajuan berarti dalam perlindungan dan pemajuan hak asasi. Perbaikan tekstual ini tampak dalam amandemen UUD hingga aturan dan ratifikasi 7 konvensi HAM. Telah pula tersedia mekanisme untuk me-review berbagai kebijakan dan perangkat peraturan perundangan. Berbagai persoalan perenial hak asasi seperti paham universalitas, justiciability, dan agenda mematahkan impunitas mulai menemukan jalan keluarnya. Meskipun demikian kapasitas dan kecepatan negara merespons penyelesaian hukum berbagai kasus pelanggaran hak asasi masih sangat rendah. Dalam hal menyangkut hak sosial ekonomi berbagai persoalan dasar hak asasi tersebut masih laten terjadi.

Perbaikan ini terutama terjadi pada ’kelompok’ hak asasi sipil politik, dan tidak pada hak ekonomi, sosial budaya. Misalnya, kebebasan berorganisasi mendirikan partai politik mengalami perubahan sangat besar dari 3 korporatisme partai politik menjadi 33 partai politik yang independen dari kekuasaan negara. Pemilu/pilkada pun menjadi diskursus publik sehari-hari.

Perumusan standar juga tidak diimbangi dengan penegakannya, terutama dalam pengungkapan kebenaran maupun pemberian keadilan bagi korban. Alih-alih memberi keadilan – hak asasi seperti kehilangan daya yang mempunyai kekuatan untuk menentukan kemendasarannya. Makna hak asasi telah dikikis sehingga kehilangan nilai dan tujuannya. Dalam praktek hak asasi menjadi komoditi politik elit kekuasaan di semua tingkatan.

Gagasan bahwa hak asasi akan terjamin dalam sistem politik demokratis dan sebaliknya demokrasi harus dilandaskan pada hak asasi mengalami pelecehan. Demokrasi pertama-tama dan bahkan melulu dipraktekkan sebagai cara daripada tujuan dan nilai. Aktor-aktor dominan memakai demokrasi bukan untuk mencapai keadilan dan kemakmuran, melainkan lebih sebagai prosedur.

Pemisahan kekuasaan tergantung pada kompromi. Kebijakan desentralisasi lebih mefasilitasi elit lokal, dan mengasingkan satu daerah dengan daerah lain dari nilai-nilai solidaritas daripada mendistribusi kekuasaan ke daerah-daerah. Partai-partai politik tidak menjalankan fungsi utama mereka terutama dalam merepresentasikan berbagai kepentingan vital rakyat. Dalam tataran perilaku nilai-nilai demokrasi seperti pluralisme dihalangi.

Keadaan hak asasi tidak lepas dari arus globalisasi. Globalisasi saat ini menjadikan pasar bebas sebgai menjadi satu-satunya ’ideologi’. Pada saat yang sama terjadi peningkatan jumlah MNC/TNC yang memanfaatkan dibukanya batas-batas kekuasaan negara dan berperilaku sebagai roving bandist; para bandit yang bergerak secara anarkis dan memeras kekayaan sumber daya ekonomi sampai habis. Di tingkat nasional terjadi persengkongkolan antara pelaku-pelaku bisnis dan politik, yang dipermudah oleh demokrasi prosedural. Hal ini membawa akibat jatuhnya korban-korban kelaparan, pengangguran, bunuh diri, penyakit, meningginya kematian ibu dan balita dan anak-anak putus sekolah. Bersamaan dengan itu hak-hak berekspresi dan berorganisasi dihambat dalam praktik.

Dievaluasi bahwa stagnasi demokrasi dan pemajuan hak asasi terjadi karena penyingkiran negara dari ekonomi tidak dipersoalkan. Demokrasi dan hak asasi tidak masuk dalam ’wilayah’ pasar. Akibatnya negara tidak berdaya di hadapan pasar. Dalam menghadapai porak-porandanya hak asasi dan demokrasi di Indonesia apa yang dapat diusulkan? Sehubungan dengan hal ini digagas empat agenda penting:

1. Mengundang kembali negara untuk menjalankan fungsi-fungsinya.
2. Kembalikan demokrasi sosial yang berbasiskan pada kekuatan rakyat sebagai pemangku kekuasaan.
3. Perkuat aktor strategis.
4. Prioritaskan pemajuan hak sosial ekonomi

2. Hak-hak Ekonomi, Sosial dan Budaya: Landasan Keadilan Sosial

Indonesia telah berada dalam sistem demokrasi, namun demokrasi substansial belum tercapai. Hal ini karena masih bercokolnya kepentingan-kepentingan kekuatan patronase orde baru. Agen-agen reformis kehilangan kendali atas institusi demokrasi dan tak mampu bertarung dengan kekuatan predatoris dalam negara. Kepentingan-kepentingan ini secara langsung atau tidak langsung meniadakan hak-hak atas pendidikan, kesehatan, maupun tempat tinggal yang layak.

Meski secara normatif hak asasi melekat pada manusia, dalam praktek hak asasi harus direbut! Meskipun telah banyak tumbuh serikat-serikat rakyat, tidak ada kelompok pengimbang yang terorganisasi secara koheren. Akibatnya hak itu tak dapat dipenuhi untuk para korban yang terus menerus berjatuhan. Kondisi itu terjadi sejak 1965 ketika orde baru secara sistematis dan masal melakukan pelemahan organisasi rakyat. Gerakan hak asasi tampak hanya berkecimpung dalam diskursus dan belum cukup membangun kekuatan pengimbang yang signifikan.

Dalam kekosongan kekuatan pengimbang, kelompok kekuatan predatoris di kalangan elit politik dan pengusaha dengan cepat mengisi kekuasaan pemerintahan dan beradaptasi dengan sistem demokrasi yang ada. Mereka membawa kepentingan dan nilai-nilai fundamentalisme pasar yang pada gilirannya meniadakan hak asasi terutama hak-hak ekonomi, sosial dan budaya. Hal ini dibangun sejak zaman orde baru sebagaimana diindikasikan dengan lahirnya UU Penanaman Modal Asing No.1/1967.

Disamping itu masih ada mind-set yang melihat hak ekonomi-sosial-budaya bukan sebagai hak asasi, baik di kalangan pemerintah maupun di kalangan masyarakat sipil dan terutama sektor bisnis. Pemajuan dan perlindungannya masih masih sangat lemah dibanding hak sipil politik. Oleh karena itu perlu memprioritaskan pemajuan hak ekonomi sosial budaya.

Dengan globalisasi yang berlaku saat ini, korporasi memiliki kekuasaan besar bahkan lebih besar dari negara. Fenomena baru mengharuskan kita menggunakan paradigma tri-kotomi ”warga, negara dan bisnis” dibanding sekedar paradigma dikotomi ”warga dan negara” dalam memajukan dan melindungi hak asasi manusia. Oleh karena itu dirasa perlu adanya berbagai agenda untuk mengendalikan dominasi kekuatan-kekuatan modal besar, melalui dua strategi. Pertama, dengan membebaskan kekuasaan politik dari intervensi kekuatan modal. Kedua, memperluas kerangka pertanggung-jawaban hak asasi manusia tidak melulu pada negara, akan tetapi juga meletakkan bisnis dalam pertanggung jawaban hak asasi. Hal ini tidak berarti menghilangkan peran negara sebagai pemangku tanggung jawab utama hak asasi, melainkan meningkatkan tanggung jawabnya dalam melindungi individu dari ancaman kekuatan modal. Misalnya dengan memastikan bahwa bisnis bertanggung jawab pada publik.

Untuk itu sejumlah agenda berikut dicanangkan:

1. Usut berbagai pelanggaran hak ekosob yang selama ini telah terjadi secara sistematis di wilayah keruk alam, diawali dari Freeport, Lapindo, Newmont, RAPP, APP dan beberapa korporasi skala besar lainya [jangka pendek]
2. Perlu peninjauan kembali seluruh perizinan konsesi hutan dan tambang termasuk renegoisasi dan atau nasionalisasi kontrak-kontrak yang selama ini potensial melanggar hak ekosob [jangka pendek]
3. Menggunakan pendekatan hak asasi manusia dalam pembuatan kebijakan (Right-Based-Approach to Develop Policies)
4. Mengkaji berbagai peraturan perundangan yang selama ini memperbesar kuasa dan dominasi korporasi di Indonesia dan memperlemah masyarakat
5. Mendorong adanya kebijakan program pemulihan hak-hak ekosob yang selama ini dilanggar, serta pemulihan ekosistem secara menyeluruh yang mengikat semua pihak sebagai bagian dari upaya untuk tidak mengulang kembali pelanggaran HAM di kemudian hari. [jangka panjang]
6. Mengembangkan pertanggungjawaban pidana terhadap perbuatan korporasi yang melanggar hak asasi manusia.
7. Mengembangkan indikator hak ekosob dengan melibatkan korban dan partisipasi masyarakat dan pemerintah lokal.
8. Kampanye atas justiciability hak ekosob.
9. Meningkatkan perlindungan dan penguatan ‘korban’.
10. Memperkuat kewenangan dan institusi Komnas HAM antara lain dengan mereformai UU HAM dan Pengadilan HAM

3. Tantangan dan Agenda Hak Sipil Politik

Sejak reformasi, jaminan perlindungan dan pemajuan hak asasi manusia khususnya hak sipil dan politik mengalami kemajuan berarti dalam tataran normatif dan institusional. Terdapat berbagai produk hukum yang dimaksudkan untuk memberikan penghormatan dan perlindungan hak ini. Norma-norma umum hak asasi manusia dapat ditemukan disamping pada Amandemen UUD 1945, Tap MPR tentang hak asasi manusia adalah UU HAM dan Pengadilan HAM dan ratifikasi enam instrumen pokok hak asasi internasional. Menyangkut kebebasan berekspresi cukup terjamin pada UU tentang Kemerdekaan Menyampaikan Pendapat, UU Pers, dan terakhir UU Kebebasan Memperoleh Informasi Publik yang memperkuat hak untuk mengawasi proses pengambilan keputusan publik. Hak-hak sipil warga diperkuat dengan UU kewarganegaraan dan UU Perlindungan saksi dan korban. Hak-hak warga untuk ikut menentukan pemerintahan diupayakan dalam UU Partai Politik, Pemilihan Umum, dan Susunan dan Kedudukan DPR. Lahir pula berbagai kebijakan politik menyangkut desentralisasi pemerintahan.

Secara khusus terdapat upaya pemisahan kepolisian dari TNI (UU tentang Kepolisian). Di kedua institusi TNI dan Polri meski masih sangat minimal terdapat upaya untuk menjadi lebih profesional, serta upaya-upaya melakukan demiliterisasi kepolisian. Reformasi institusional juga terjadi pada lembaga-lembaga yudisial berupa pembentukan Mahkamah Konstitusi dan Pengadilan ad hoc, yang dapat menjadi mekanisme penegakan hak asasi. Perbaikan-perbaikan institusional ini dikawal oleh berbagai lembaga auxiliare seperti KPK, Komisi Nasional Perlindungan Perempuan dari Tindakan Kekerasan, Komisi Perlindungan Hak Anak, dan Komisi Ombudsman Nasional.

Berbagai kemajuan ini tampak membawa implikasi positif pada kebebasan politik. Yang kasat mata terlihat berbagai organisasi rakyat maupun menjamurnya partai-partai politik. Pemilihan umum baik secara nasional maupun lokal berlangsung relatif aman dan pengungkapan kasus-kasus korupsi juga terus mengalir.

Yang tampak tidak selalu menggambarkan kenyataan sesungguhnya. Berbagai kemajuan itu dihadang oleh perilaku tirani mayoritas atas kelompok minoritas agama maupun politik. Para pemeluk agama minoritas seperti kaum Bahai maupun aliran kepercayaan diperlakukan secara diskriminasi. Demikian pula yang dialami oleh Ahmadiyah. Diskriminasi ini juga terjadi dalam bentuk peraturan-peraturan daerah syariat.

Secara politis diskriminasi terjadi pada simpatisan partai kiri, PKI maupun terhadap mereka yang memiliki gagasan-gagasan politik kiri maupun negara Islam. Dalam menghadapi masalah demikian negara cenderung melakukan pembiaran bahkan mengkriminalkan korban.

Supremasi hukum yang berkeadilan juga masih sangat lemah. Terdapat jurang yang lebar antara yang normatif dan penegakannya. Praktik penyiksaan masih tetap terjadi, bukan hanya di tempat-tempat penahanan/penghukuman akan tetapi juga tempat-tempat lain. Disamping itu, selama hampir sepuluh tahun terakhir sistem hukum dan jajaran aparatur negaranya tidak mampu menjawab berbagai kasus pembunuhan dalam konflik-konflik horizontal dan vertikal serta kasus-kasus pelanggaran berat hak asasi masa lalu. Budaya impunitas terus menjangkiti sistem hukum kita – yang dikhawatirkan akan terus memproduksi budaya kekerasan maupun menghancurkan sistem demokrasi yang sudah ada. Warisan pola militeristik dalam lembaga-lembaga keamanan terutama kepolisian masih kuat mengakar. Reformasi di tubuh Polri belum menyentuh reformasi kultural dan belum melembaga.

Diyakini bahwa berbagai kesenjangan ini terjadi antara lain karena, pertama, upaya penegakan hak asasi manusia lebih menekankan formalisme hukum daripada penataan ulang politik hak asasi manusia.

Kedua, karena monopoli akses atas sumber-sumber daya publik oleh modal dan birokrat, yang pada gilirannya menghambat proses politik dan penegakan hukum demi pemenuhan hak-hak asasi manusia.

Ketiga, karena tidak tersedianya otonomi asosiasional bagi hadirnya demokrasi substantif; yaitu peluang rakyat (terutama lapisan bawah) mengorganisasikan diri demi mempertahankan kepentingan dan identitas sendiri tanpa takut akan dicampuri atau diganggu oleh pemerintah.

Hal ini tampak dari praktek partai politik yang meletakkan rakyat sekedar sebagai ‘clients’, yang secara politik tersubordinasi. Rakyat menjadi objek kegiatan ‘politik prosedural.’ Sebagai akibatnya rakyat harus mengorbankan hak mengartikulasi kepentingan secara otonom sehingga tak dapat mengakses sumber-sumber daya publik. Lembaga-lembaga negara maupun masyarakat dalam ranah politik tak mampu menawarkan pelayanan publik dalam memoderatkan, moderasi/mediasi konflik-konflik politik, dan refining political demands, sehingga perlu ditetapkan strategi minimal untuk mencegah pembajakan demokrasi oleh kekuatan-kekuatan anti-pembaruan dalam beberapa rekomendasi umum berikut ini:

1. Perluasan saluran bagi warga yang memungkinkan partisipasi efektif dalam politik
2. Perluasan demokrasi ke tempat kerja, sehingga buruh/pegawai punya kemungkinan “memiliki” lahan kerjanya.
3. Pengurangan pengaruh pemodal besar terhadap sistem politik.
4. Penguatan kemampuan negara dalam mengendalikan elit ekonomi.
5. Penciptaan bentuk-bentuk baru regulasi ekonomi pasar, nasional dan internasional.
6. Pengembangan kebijakan sosial yang efektif
7. Pemanfaatan teknologi informasi baru untuk mengembangkan bentuk pengorganisasian politik berdasar jaringan.

Penyelesaian pelanggaran HAM yang berat masa lalu

1. Penguatan kewenangan Komnas HAM dalam penyidikan pelanggaran hak asasi dan pemberian imunitas bagi penyidik Komnas HAM
2. Civil society mengawal setiap upaya perlindungan korban

Agama

1. Mengadakan dialog (antaragama) dan mencegah penghakiman pada pihak lain dalam konflik
2. Melakukan pendidikan pluralisme sejak dini
3. Melakukan perwujudan nilai-nilai agama yang akomodatif terhadap nilai-nilai kemanusiaan.
4. Mendorong kearifan lokal yang tidak bertentangan dengan nilai-nilai hak asasi
5. Melakukan integrasi masyarakat tanpa tekanan negara.
6. Meningkatkan partisipasi publik terhadap seluruh kebijakan pemerintah yang mengancam kebebasan beragama.

Penyiksaan

1. Melakukan revisi atas KUHAP dan KUHP
2. Mempercepat pengesahan protokol opsional pada Konvensi Menentang Penyiksaan dan Perlakuan atau Penghukuman lain yang Kejam, Tidak Manusiawi, atau Merendahkan Martabat.
3. Membangun budaya anti kekerasan
4. Melakukan revisi UU No.39/1999 tentang Hak Asasi Manusia dan UU Pengadilan HAM.

Keamanan

1. Mendorong implementasi Kurikulum TNI Polri yang lebih berwawasan HAM.
2. Mendorong oversight pelaksanaan kegiatan dan budget oleh parlemen
3. Mendorong pembentukan lembaga-lembaga pemantau institusi keamanan yang bersifat independen.
4. Perubahan paradigma menyangkut ide, konsep, dan perilaku dalam masalah keamanan nasional.
5. Perubahan legislasi dan kebijakan keamanan yang lebih berorientasi Human Dignity Security sebagai Framework.
6. Security Sector Reform harus meletakan Human dignity Security sebagai tatanan tertinggi.
7. Mendorong reformasi Badan Intelejen.

Source : www.komnasham.go.id

Down to Earth, November 2007

http://dte.gn.apc.org

West Papua / forests:

Oil palm plantations? Carbon credits? Papua's forests targeted

Large areas of Papua's rich and diverse forests are being targeted by Indonesian and overseas investors for conversion into oil palm plantations. At the same time, discussions are in progress to reserve large areas of Papua's forest to generate carbon credits for trade on international markets. Decisions about these developments will very probably be made over the heads of the people who will be most directly affected by them: the indigenous Papuan communities whose livelihoods largely depend on the resources in their forests.

Indigenous Papuans have borne the negative impacts of top-down development for decades - from Indonesia's disastrous transmigration scheme, in which indigenous forest land was taken for agricultural schemes involving imported Javanese labour 1, to the giant Freeport/Rio Tinto gold and copper mine. Since the 1970s the Freeport mine has carved up Papua's mountains to get at the valuable minerals, and has dumped billions of tonnes of mining waste downstream. 'Development' has also meant dividing up Papua's indigenous-owned forests for logging and for oil and gas exploration. Though it attempts to present a community-friendly face, the BP-operated Tangguh gas project in Bintuni Bay shares with all these projects the fact that it is large-scale, decided and directed by non-Papuans and is largely aimed at benefiting outsiders 2. Underlying all of these imposed projects, is the stark fact that Papua's political status is an imposition in itself, as Papua's 1969's 'Act of Free Choice' - on whether or not to be part of Indonesia - has been shown to be a total sham. This means that any opposition to such schemes from local people is open to interpretation by Jakarta as security problem to be countered with military force.

Given this historical mix of imposition, export-orientated resource exploitation and military enforcement, it is not surprising that poverty levels among the indigenous population remain high - despite the fact that Papua's income has risen steeply after the introduction of regional autonomy revenue-sharing rules. Since ‘special autonomy’ for Papua was Indonesia's means of undermining calls for independence, the fact that poverty levels remain so high is troubling the Jakarta government. Earlier this year, president SBY issued a decree aimed at speeding up development in Papua. But, as yet another top-down initiative, this is unlikely to bring positive results while more fundamental problems are left untouched 3.

The latest schemes being talked about for Papua are a major expansion in oil palm plantations and setting aside forests for international carbon markets. The first of these appears to be very much in the mould of previous schemes (top-down, export-orientated, involves overseas companies, takes over indigenous-owned lands and is being promoted by Jakarta). The second is different in two main ways: it aims to create income by protecting a resource, rather than directly exploiting (and exhausting) it, and it is being promoted not by Jakarta, but by Papua's governor, Barnabas Suebu. From a purely environmental perspective, the idea of protecting forests for carbon credits may be attractive, but there are serious questions over how effectively such schemes will protect the forests at all, and what implications they will have for local forest-dependent communities whose forests are targeted (see also DTE 74:1, http://dte.gn.apc.org/74acl.htm).

Oil Palm Plantations

Exactly how much Papuan land is being set aside for oil palm plantations is not clear, but recent announcements range from one million hectares to be developed very soon, to four or even five million hectares in the next ten years 4. According to Indonesia's Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) there are over two million hectares of land in Papua available for oil palm development. Most of this (1.935 million ha) is spread through nine districts in Papua province, with the remaining 150,000 ha in the recently renamed 'West Papua' province 5. BKPM classifies this land as 'state and customary/collective land' (Tanah Negara & Ulayat) 6.

The BKPM data states that land already taken for oil palm schemes covers around 90,000 hectares in Papua, and around 30,000 in West Papua. According to Department of Agriculture data, Papua has three oil palm production units with a processing capacity of 120 tonnes of fresh palm oil fruits per hour 7.

Sawit Watch, the Indonesian NGO network working on oil palm issues, puts oil palm expansion plans for Papua at the higher figure of 3 million hectares, but has lower estimates for existing plantation cover at 40,889 hectares. According to these figures, Papua's expansion plans are second only to West Kalimantan (5 million hectares) and are the same as those of Riau province in Sumatra 8.

A much higher figure for land available for biofuel development (oil palm, plus other biofuel crops) is given by Indonesia’s National Team on Biofuel Development, which puts land available in Papua at a staggering 9,262,130 hectares, at least three times higher than in any other province 9.

The Jakarta government says that biofuel development will only go ahead on non-productive forest land, but in Papua, as elsewhere, it is clear that timber-rich forests are being set aside for such schemes.

Using just the lower estimates for land targeted for oil palm, this means that between one fifth and one third of Papua's 9.3 million hectares of 'conversion' forests are likely to be targeted for oil palm under government plans. Papua is estimated to have around 17.9 million hectares of intact forests of a total official forest zone of 39.7 million ha 10, but these are diminishing fast as destructive logging by legal and illegal operations takes its toll 11.

Some of the plans for Papua are well-advanced. In April, governor Suebu said that he had agreed to release a million hectares of indigenous land for oil palm investment, at the request of three investors alone. Two of these are Indonesian (Sinar Mas Group, Medco Group) and the other is Malaysian (Felda). The focus would be biodiesel markets, he said, and would make Papua a source of energy for countries starting to run short of fossil fuels. "Now is the era of green energy, no longer fossil energy", he said 12.

Sinar Mas, the huge pulp and paper conglomerate whose interests include south-east Asia's biggest paper pulp plant, has plans for oil palm mostly in the southern part of Papua, in the districts of Mappi, Boven Digul and Merauke. This company, which is in a joint venture with China's CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation), has signed memorandums of understanding for 200,000 hectares in each district 13. (CNOOC is also a shareholder in the BP-operated Tangguh gas project in Bintuni Bay, West Papua.)

But, according to a document seen by the Straits Times, Sinar Mas' 'wish-list' plans are much more ambitious, covering a massive 2.8 million hectares: 603,000 ha in Merauke, 637,000 ha in Mappi and 914,000 ha in Boven Digul plus large areas in three other districts north of the central highlands: Sarmi (313,000ha), Keerom (186,000ha) and Jayapura (163,000ha) 14. In all cases, except Mappi district, these figures exceed the official figure for land available for oil palm development as set out by Indonesia's Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) 15.

Other investors interested in buying into Papua's oil palm for biofuel rush are reported to include:

· Malaysia’s Genting Bhd, through its Singapore-based company, Genting Biofuels Asia Pte Ltd: US$3 billion for a 400,000 ha palm oil plantation for biofuels;

· Indonesia's Muting Mekar Hijau: 540,000 hectares of palm oil and sugar;

· Indonesia's Rajawali Corp (Keerom district);

· Indomal: 300,000 ha of oil palm in Merauke and Sula (North Maluku) districts.

A company called Trans Pacific, a joint venture between Indonesian, Singaporean and Chinese investors, is also reported to be interested in developing biofuel from sago 16.

For Indonesia as a whole, according to Business Watch Indonesia, by early 2007 as many as sixty agreements on biofuel development projects, including 14 foreign investors, had been signed 17.

Oil palm's murky record

Based on past experience, such large-scale projects bring potential for conflict, human rights abuses and marginalisation of people at the local level.

A report by ICG, published in July this year, reveals chronic problems with existing plantations developed by Korean investor Korindo in Boven Digul district, in the southern part of Papua. These problems relate to land rights, access to resources and the influx of non-Papuan workers. ICG estimates that if Sinar Mas goes ahead with its projects in southern Papua (200,000 hectares in three districts), each project would require 60,000 workers, meaning in Boven Digul's case, "an influx of 42,000 non-Papuans - a number larger than the entire district's current population." 18

Recent reports from the Institute for Papuan Advocacy and Human Rights indicate how such explosive situations can turn violent. In July the group reported that a West Papuan man was dying in hospital after being tortured by members of the military at a military base at Asiki, near the Korindo concession. The following month, the group reported the death of a non-Papuan Korindo employee in a clash between company workers and indigenous Muyu. Local people had previously reported the death of at least one Papuan killed by the military. "The recent violence …appears to be as a result of longstanding dispute[s] over land rights between Korindo and local indigenous traditional landowners," said Matthew Jamieson of IPAHR. "Ultimately the conflict over the expansion of oil palms is driven by international demand for bio-fuel. This will involve the destruction of millions of hectares of rainforest and with it the indigenous populations who have lived in and managed these forests for thousands of years", said Jamieson 19.

Impunity

The fact that the military and police are at hand to protect the company's interests is in itself a reminder of Papua's long record of human rights atrocities committed by the armed forces, and the history of impunity. The military presence is also more entrenched. With the creation of more districts in Papua, more district military and police command posts have been established, ensuring a tighter military mesh. This puts further pressure on local natural resources, since a large part of the military budget is made up from external businesses. Personnel often turn to resource-based projects to generate income - either legally or illegally - but both in ways that push aside the interests of local people.

Papuans have little recourse to the law due to the continuing low status of indigenous rights under Indonesian law. This means indigenous groups have almost no effective protection from competing land use rights awarded by district, provincial or central authorities. Despite a general provision for respecting customary rights under Papua's Special Autonomy law, their legal status has still not been clarified. A required special regional regulation (Perdasus) on land rights and forestry which was drafted in 2006 (see DTE 69:11, http://dte.gn.apc.org/69for.htm) has not yet been debated by the provincial parliament 20.

Elsewhere in Indonesia, palm oil plantations are associated with pollution problems and pesticide use, which have a disproportionate impact on women's health (see DTE 66:9, http://dte.gn.apc.org/66pes.htm). It is reasonable to expect that these problems will also exist in current and future plantations in Papua.

One fundamental problem, long associated with oil palm schemes throughout Indonesia is the use of oil palm projects as a front for gaining access to valuable timber. Regional governments have often complained about the 'cut and run' tactics of companies who commit to providing jobs and creating income for the local economy by developing large-scale plantations (not just oil palm, but pulpwood and other cash crops), but which are only really interested in selling off the hardwood from the natural forests in their concessions. Now that oil palm prices have skyrocketed, with the new demand for biofuels, there is more of an incentive for companies to actually develop the plantations after logging the timber. However, with a company like Sinar Mas, which owns pulp mills whose capacity for processing timber far outstrips the legal supply, accessing Papua's forests is likely to still be a major motivation for investment (for more background on Sinar Mas-APP’s pulp project see DTE 52:14 http://dte.gn.apc.org/52plp.htm, 56:4 http://dte.gn.apc.org/56plp2.htm and 61:16 http://dte.gn.apc.org/61BRF.htm).

Doubts?

Governor Bas Suebu has portrayed himself as an enthusiastic supporter of oil palm expansion in Papua. A Bisnis Indonesia report in April this year quoted the governor's calculations that 2 million hectares of plantations developed over the next 10-15 years, would provide work and prosperity for some 250,000 families 21. He is also quoted by ICG as describing the oil palm development programme as "waking the sleeping giant" of Papua's economic potential 22. However, he has also warned potential investors that they must be committed to the developments, and not just take the timber and disappear.

The ICG report also notes a cautious approach towards Sinar Mas investments in the three southern Papuan districts: "Although district governments have signed memorandums of understanding with a dozen prospective plantation investors, no formal permission has yet been granted. The provincial government is in the process of developing strategies to minimise social disruption before opening up more land, including a stipulation that indigenous Papuans must be given priority for labour and work contracts." The group notes that Sinar Mas itself may be judged incapable of managing 600,000 ha because it has planted only 12,000 ha of 40,000 ha of land it was granted as long ago as 1992 23.

Indonesian MPs have also raised suspicions about the motive of large companies making biofuel investments in Papua. Ishartanto, for example, member of a national parliamentary commission on forests and plantations, said the programme was over-ambitious. Providing enough seedlings for just one million hectares would be problematic, let alone finding enough workers and managers. He estimated that developing 300,000 hectares alone could take 12 years - and that would be in an area with good infrastructure, unlike Papua. He said such investors were interested in the timber, using land to raise capital and, while incapable of developing the land themselves, wanted to prevent access by others 24.

Forest protection for carbon credits

It is interesting that the Bisnis Indonesia report in which Suebu promotes the benefits of oil palm development came out just one day before a very different message was put out and widely reported by the international press. This was his joint statement with fellow governors of West Papua and Aceh pledging to "implement environmentally friendly policies, sustainable development and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions" 25. The international message on forest protection was later firmed up by Suebu, when he claimed in an interview with the Wall Street Journal to be resisting pressure from Jakarta to develop oil palm plantations 26. The article says that Suebu wants to protect more than half of the land targeted for development. The protected forest would then be used to earn carbon credits. Forest protection, or 'avoided deforestation' - is expected to be accepted as an official means of generating carbon credits at December's Bali climate change summit, http://dte.gn.apc.org/74acl.htm DTE 74:1 for more background on this issue).

This stance appears to have assisted the governor's nomination for an environmental award from Time Magazine, in October 2007. The governor told Time, "Pressure on our forests is coming from the forestry department because they are still operating with an old mindset…They need to realize that there is a new paradigm now and we are not going to repeat the mistakes of the past" 27.

It is quite possible, of course, that Suebu believes that it is possible both to develop oil palm plantations as well as forest protection for carbon credits as ways of earning income for Papua.

But even the supposedly 'green' approach of avoided deforestation does not bear too close an examination. According to the Wall Street Journal, a 30-year-old Australian millionaire, Dorjee Sun, has been instrumental in persuading Barnabas Suebu to take up avoided deforestation so enthusiastically.

After the governors' joint statement on forest protection in April, Mr Sun bought a controlling stake in the Carbon Pool Pty. Ltd., a small Australian company. In 2006, this company bought farmers' rights to over 12,000 hectares in Queensland and sold the resulting carbon credits to Anglo-Australian mining multinational, Rio Tinto in one of the world's first avoided-deforestation trades. According to WSJ, Sun wants to interest Rio Tinto in carbon schemes in Papua and Aceh and the company itself is "keen to look at other opportunities".

It really would be some dreadful irony if Rio Tinto - a major investor in the highly destructive Freeport mine in Papua, set about offsetting its carbon emissions (or continuing to pollute) by buying credits generated by Papua's forests.

Since the Freeport mining operations have destroyed large areas of forest, some might say that this would be paying something back to Papua and Papuans, but at what price? If Papua's forests are to be traded for carbon credits - who will decide which forests should be set aside? Who will benefit? How much will go to Jakarta? How much will go to Papua? And how much, if anything, will go to indigenous Papuans whose forests are to remain protected?

According to Papuan commentator Neles Tebay: "If the government is really committed to accelerating development in Papua, then President Yudhoyono should pursue a more dialogical method based on three fundamental principles: peace, democracy and dignity, as proposed by the president himself in December 2005." 28

This should apply to governor Barnabas Suebu as well as the Indonesian president, when planning large-scale oil palm developments and setting aside forests for carbon trading. If the principles of human rights and free, prior and informed consent continue to be ignored, these schemes will more than likely fail to improve the lives of Papuans. Instead, there is a risk that they will sustain the current cycle of conflict over resources, military aggression and human rights abuses suffered by Papuans for so long.

Palm oil in Papua

District	Used for oil palm (ha)	Available for oil palm (ha)	Status of land
Boven Digul	-	300,000	State and community
Jayapura	51,589	90,000	State and community
Keerom	6,000	100,000	State and community
Mappi	-	800,000	State and community
Merauke	500	400,000	State and community
Nabire	-	35,000	State and community
Paniai	-	60,000	State and community
Puncakjaya	-	100,000	State and community
Sarmi	31,738	-	State and community
Waropen	-	50,000	State and community
TOTAL	89, 827	1, 935, 000

(Source: BKPM website accessed 27/Oct/2007; data updated Jan 2007; http://regionalinvestment.com/sipid/id/commodityarea.php?ic=2&ia=91)

Note: some of these figures may conflict with other sources: eg in the ICG report which states that in Boven Digul district, Korindo has cleared around 4,000 ha of a 7,000 ha oil palm block in the southern part of the district. See Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict, Crisis Group Aisa Briefing No 66, July 2007, p.7)

Notes:

1. See DTE's report on transmigration at http://dte.gn.apc.org/ctrans.htm
2. For more on Tangguh see DTE 73:4 or http://dte.gn.apc.org/73tan.htm
3. For details and opinion on the decree, see Jakarta Post 30/Aug/07
4. The higher figure comes from Governor Barnabas Suebu, as quoted in Bisnis Indonesia 25/Apr/07.
5. Papua's split into two provinces was imposed by Jakarta against local opposition. The new 'Irian Jaya Barat' province was renamed 'Papua Barat' (West Papua - the name commonly used by supporters of self-determination or independence). It means that Papua's provinces are now 'West Papua' and 'Papua'.
6. See http://regionalinvestment.com/sipid/id/commodityarea.php?ia=91&ic=2 for a breakdown of land already used and available for oil palm in ten of Papua's districts (accessed 23/Oct/07). For the whole of Indonesia land available for oil palm amounts to: 2,967,194 ha, while land already developed is: 3,955,070 ha. See: http://regionalinvestment.com/sipid/id/commodity.php?ic=2 (Accessed 30/Oct/07). These figures conflict with information from the Department of Agriculture that Indonesia has 6 million hectares of oil palm plantation and plans at provincial level that may add up to as much as another 20 million ha.
7. Quoted in Bisnis Indonesia 25/Apr/07
8. See Promised Land: Palm Oil and Land Acquisition in Indonesia - Implications for Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples by Marcus Colchester, Norman Jiwan, Andiko, Martua Sirait, Asep Yunan Firdaus, A. Surambo and Herbert Pane (2006) Forest Peoples Programme, Sawit Watch, HuMA and ICRAF, Bogor (also available in Bahasa Indonesia). Can be downloaded from www.sawitwatch.or.id or www.forestpeoples.org
9. Figures quoted in Business Watch Indonesia, Biofuel Industry in Indonesia: some critical issues.
10. See DTE 69:11 for more Papuan forest figures from various sources, including Forests Watch Indonesia.
11. See DTE 69:11 and Greenpeace SEAsia press release 21/Aug/07.
12. Bisnis Indonesia 25/Apr/07
13. Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict, Crisis Group Asia Briefing No.66, 19/Jul/07
14. Straits Times 23/Aug/07
15. According to head of Papua’s chamber of commerce and industry, John M Kabey, speaking in April 2007, Sinar Mas will open plantations in five districts - Boven Digul, Mappi, Merauke, Sarmi and Jayapura, covering a total 1 million hectares and costing between Rp21.6 and 24.6 trillion. This, he said, would produce more than130,000 barrels of biofuel per day. The target was for the five districts to become fuel self-sufficient by the sixth year of investment, and ready to export biofuel in the seventh year (Investor Daily 24/Apr/07 via Watch! Indonesia)
16. http://www.papua.go.id/berita_det.php/en/1241, accessed 22/Oct/07; additional sources: Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Indonesia's Experience on Biofuels Development, Power point presentation to International Biofuel Conference 5/Jul/07, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/energy/biofuels/sessions/s1_02_yusgiantoro.pdf accessed 27 Oct 2007
17. Figures quoted in Business Watch Indonesia, Biofuel Industry in Indonesia: some critical issues.
18. Crisis Group Asia Briefing No.66, p5.
19. Media Release, IAPHR 24/Aug/07
20. Crisis Group Asia Briefing No.66, p5.
21. Bisnis Indonesia 25/Apr.07
22. Crisis Group Asia Briefing No.66, p5.
23. Crisis Group Asia Briefing No.66, p5.
24. Investor Daily 24/Apr/07; Kompas Cybermedia 20/Apr/07, ‘Papua akan buka lahan sawit tiga juta hektar’, http://64.203.71.11/ver1/Nusantara/0704/20/124808.htm
25. Reuters 26/Apr/07
26. Wall Street Journal 10/Aug/07
27. Time Magazine 29/Oct/07
28. Pastor Neles Tebay writing in Jakarta Post 30/Aug/07

Thanks to Watch Indonesia! for contributions to this article

Tanah Papua: Paru-paru dunia yang harus dijaga

Oleh Arief Wicaksono

Indonesia — Pemerintah Propinsi Papua dan Papua Barat menyelenggarakan pertemuan kedua kalinya dengan Mitra Pembangunan Papua yang di selenggarakan di Jayapura, Papua pada 15-20 februari 2008. Pertemuan bertujuan memetakan dan menyelaraskan tujuan-tujuan dari beberapa rencana pembangunan yang tengah berjalan atau rencana yang berasal dari prakarasa antara pemerintah, bersama para donor dan organisasi internasional lainnya.

Hadir pada pertemuan ini Emmy Hafild, Direktur eksekutif Greenpeace Asia Tenggara dengan misi untuk meyerukan penghentian pengundulan hutan (Zero Deforestation). Greenpeace hadir pada acara ini untuk menindaklanjuti dari hasil pertemuan di Bali saat Pertemuan perubahaan iklim (UNFCCC) dengan Gubernur Papua Barnabas Suebu dan Gubernur Papua Barat Abraham Oktavianus Atururi.

Tanah Papua, meliputi Propinsi Papua dan Papua Barat adalah hutan alam terakhir yang memiliki keanekaragaman hayati terkaya di dunia. Pulau New Guinea, gabungan antara Tanah Papua dan negara Papua Nugini, terletak disebelah barat Tanah Papua, merupakan Bentang Hutan Alam (Intact Forest Landscape, IFL) yang tersisa di Asia pasifik. Tanah Papua adalah permata hutan terakhir Indonesia. Sejak hutan Indonesia di pulau lainnya seperti Sumatra dan Kalimantan menyusut karena penebangan dan alih fungsi hutan secara besar-besaran untuk pembukaan perkebunan kelapa sawit. Kegiatan-kegiatan tersebut bukan saja merugikan lingkungan tetapi juga meningkatkan kemiskinan masyarakat lokal yang hidup bergantung pada hutan.

Setelah hutan-hutan menyusut dan menghilang di tempat lain, kecenderungan saat ini adalah para pembalak hutan dan perusahaan kelapa sawit tengah memburu permata hutan terkahir Indonesia yakni Tanah Papua. Jika tidak ada tindakan cepat untuk segera melindungi hutan di Tanah Papua maka nasibnya akan sama seperti hutan lainnya di Indonesia, dan Planet Bumi akan kehilangan ekosistem dan gudang karbon terpenting.

Oleh karena itu Papua dipandang memiliki nilai strategis oleh berbagai lembaga pembangunan bilateral dan multilateral untuk menangani perubahan iklim, baik melalui Protokol Kyoto maupun lewat mekanisme di luar protokol tersebut. Upaya di luar Protokol Kyoto antara lain terlihat pada upaya Menteri Kehutanan yang merencanakan proyek percontohan Pengurangan Emisi dari Penggundulan dan Degradasi Hutan atau Reduced Emission from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) di Papua, Aceh dan beberapa daerah yang masih memiliki hutan. Sementara upaya yang termasuk Protokol Kyoto mencakup beberapa rencana untuk pengembangan perkebunan kelapa sawit yang akan memenuhi pasokan biofuel [1]. Kedua prakarsa terkait dengan perubahan iklim didukung oleh satu rencana besar untuk pembangunan infrastruktur di Tanah Papua khususnya pembuatan jalan, sebagai penerapan Intruksi presiden (Inpres) no. 5 tahun 2007 tentang Percepatan Pembangunan di Propinsi Papua dan Papua Barat.

Belajar dari Kegagalan

Pertemuan kedua mitra pembangunan papua ini dibuka secara resmi oleh wakil Presiden Republik Indonesia, M Yusuf Kalla. Wakil presiden didampingi oleh tujuh menteri strategis, tetapi tanpa kehadiran Menteri Kehutanan, Menteri Pertanian dan Menteri Negara Lingkungan Hidup. Tema utama dari pertemuan adalah bagaimana menegakkan penerapan Inpres No.5 tahun 2007 dengan menempatkan pembangunan infrastruktur sebagai agenda utama yang didukung rencana penataan ruang yang menyeluruh. Terlepas dari masa depan canggih yang ditawarkan, timbul pertanyaan, apa resiko tak-terhindarkan yang akan dihadapi masyarakat Papua dan lingkungan akbat penerapan kebijakan tersebut?

„Sebagai bangsa kita harus ingat pentingnya belajar dari kegagalan yang terjadi di pulau Sumatra dan Kalimantan akibat eksploitasi berlebihan atas hutan dan sumber daya alam lainnya, yang sekarang terbukti menghasilkan bencana lingkungan sementara rakyatnya kesejahteraan rakyat tetap tertinggal” tegas Emmy Hafild kepada seluruh pejabat yang hadir pada pertemuan tersebut..

Kesejahteraan masyarakat Papua dan keselamatan lingkungan „ Pembangunan di Papua harus mempunyai satu tujuan yang tidak terpisahkan yaitu kesejahteraan masyarakat dan pelestarian lingkungan hidup di Papua. Sehingga design dari pembangunan Papua harus sudah di arahkan sejak awal untuk meminimalkan resiko lingkungan dan memaksimalkan kesejahteraan rakyat. Oleh karena itu pantas kita bertanya, Misalnya Apakah kita benar-benar membutuhkan 3 juta hektar untuk perkebunan kelapa sawit [2] untuk meningkatkan ekonomi 3 juta masyarakat Papua yang hidup berpencar dan terisolir satu sama lain di Tanah Papua, atau kita justru akan menciptakan suatu bencana baru? Apakah pembangunan infrastuktur jalan yang sedang di rancang merupakan solusi terbaik terhadap keterpencaran dan terisolasian tempat-tempat tersebut? Atau dengan kata lain, rencana ini akan mendorong kisah berikutnya tentang transmigrasi, yang selalu berujung pada konflik sosial dan kerusakan lingkungan,” lanjut Emmy .

Duta Besar Belanda untuk Indonesia Dr. Nikolaos Van Dam, Memberikan kata sambutan dengan menggunakan bahasa Indonesia dalam pertemuan tersebut „Tanah Papua adalah salah satu paru-paru dunia, tetapi apakah Papua bisa bernapas dengan baik untuk dirinya sendiri?” Seluruh bupati dan undangan yang datang pada saat itu berdiri dan memberikan tepuk tangan yang meriah atas pernyataan tersebut . Dialog pembangunan dilanjutkan dengan makan malam resmi di kediaman dinas Gubernur Papua yang dihadiri beberapa perwakilan dari organisasi Internasional.

Terima kasih kepada Greenpeace

Pada pidato sambutan Gubernur papua mengucapkan terima kasihnya kepada Greenpeace karena mendukungnya dalam lingkup yang lebih luas dan menyatakan bahwa pemerintah Propinsi Papua berkomitmen untuk melindungi hutan dan masyarakat papua. Beliau mengatakan sangat terkesan ketika melihat begitu banyak jurnalis nasional ataupun internasional yang datang pada side event yang diselenggarakan Greenpeace secara baik pada pertemuan UNFCC di Bali Desember 2007 lalu. Dalam kesempatan itu Barnabas Suebu juga berbagi cerita tentang 65 HPH yang pernah dicabut ijin operasinya tetapi kini telah memiliki pemilik baru. Departemen Kehutanan telah selesai melakukan pelelangan ke-65 HPH tersebut. Namun dia mengatakan tidak akan memberikan ijin operasi bagi ke-65 HPH dengan pemilik baru itu.

„Kami menerima dan mendukung pemerintah papua untuk mendapat bantuan dana dalam melindungi ekosistem yang ada di Papua agar dapat menjaga karbon yang tersimpan di hutan Papua. Kami percaya prakarsa itu dapat mendorong pengurangan emisi gas-gas rumah kaca yang terjadi di bumi ini. Greenpeace sangat terbuka untuk bekerjasama dengan Gubernur dan pemerintah Propinsi Papua, dan akan menyebarluaskan prakarsa tersebut untuk memperoleh dukungan politik dan keuangan lebih luas lagi,” kata Emmy Hafild menangggapi sambutan Barnabas Suebu.

Greenpeace tidak keberatan dengan pentingnya pembangunan infrastruktur bagi Papua. Tetapi kita harus belajar dari pengalaman pembangunan infrastruktur yang telah terjadi di Sumatera dan Kalimantan yang telah membuka jalan bagi eksploitasi besar-besaran hutan dan kekayaan alam. Mengangkat perekonomian masyarakat adalah hal yang penting, tetapi tidak dengan mengorbankan kekayaan keanekaragaman hayati dan integritas fungsi lingkungan hidup. Pembangunan dengan pendekatan budaya lokal menjadi pendekatan yang penting dipertimbangkan.

[1] http://home.snafu.de/watchin/CarbonDealers.htm; Marianne Klute - Carbon dealers - Papua and Aceh in Watch Indonesia! - Information & Analysis, 28 September 2007.
[2] http://www.papua.go.id/berita_det.php/id/67; Papua Siapkan Tiga Juta Hektar Lahan untuk Perkebunan Sawit (22 Apr 2004).

Source: http://home.snafu.de/watchin/Index-engl.htm

Carbon dealers - Papua and Aceh

by Marianne Klute

Aceh and Papua have taken the initiative in Indonesia against global warming: They want to limit the destruction of tropical forests and thus reduce greenhouse gas emissions. They are negotiating finance mechanisms for forest protection, and Aceh has even decided to impose a logging moratorium. Nobody can predict whether those steps will lead to success. Two things are certain: They are challenging Indonesia’s climate and forestry policies, and they will cost industrialised nations a great deal of money.

Roundtable: Climate Change

Informed readers will know that Indonesia is the third biggest emitter of greenhouse gases worldwide, after the United States and China. The causes are annual forest fires, emissions from peat drainage and fires, and rampant deforestation, which is happening at a faster pace than anywhere else in the world. Indonesia is therefore subject to intense criticism during climate debates. Given that the UN Climate Change Conference of Parties to the Climate Change Convention (COP 13) is due to take place in Bali in December 2007, Indonesia is under acute pressure to act. In Jakarta, hardly anybody seems to be concerned with preparing for COP13, whilst Jayapura and Banda Aceh show determination to act.

As part of the preparations for the UN climate conference, a high-powered Three Governors’ Roundtable was held in the upmarket resort of Nusa Dua in Bali. It was attended by Barnabas Suebu (Governor of Papua), Irwandi Yusuf (Governor of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) and Abraham Aturui (Governor of Papua Barat, before April called Irian Jaya Barat). The organisers and sponsors of the Roundtable included the Australian government, the World Bank and some other organisations such as Flora and Fauna International (FFI) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).

On the agenda was nothing less than a common policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The governors decided to make economic development in their provinces more environmentally friendly and sustainable, primarily by reducing deforestation. They hope to achieve this through some remarkable measures: Aceh agreed to stop logging. The moratorium which was announced has now been enacted. Through a logging moratorium, Aceh hopes to gain time for revising its forestry policy. Papua is determined to outlaw the export of wood. Suebu and Aturui did not have the courage to follow the example of Aceh and ban logging completely. For the time being they plan to examine concessions and, if necessary, revoke them if they cannot change the local forestry industry for the better in the two Papuan provinces.

The most important result of the Roundtable is the decision, to protect part of the forest from destruction. The initial idea was to protect half of the ten million hectares of ‘conversion forest’ which Jakarta seeks to ‘convert’ to plantations and to maintain those with the help of carbon finance. The original plan, however, had to be scaled down. The decision was to protect not five but just one million hectares. Several pilot projects are planned in the provinces, covering at least 500,000 hectares of forest in Papua. If they succeed then Suebu promises to expand the area to four million hectares.

In order to realise those hopeful plans, Papua and Aceh require international support in the form of finance according to the carbon trading model, as well as technology transfer. The aim is a new model of ‘Avoided Deforestation’, in which money is paid not for afforestation and reforestation, but for protecting natural forests. The Australian government has promised $AS 200 million for avoided deforestation, afforestation and for sustainable forestry. A large proportion of the money, however, will be paid via the government in Jakarta, not directly to Aceh and Papua.

The Governors’ Roundtable sends a clear signal to the international community that Indonesians are aware of the international climate debate and their own responsibilities. Aceh and Papua demonstrate the firm will to finally put an end to deforestation. Not without good reason, since the governors confirmed in a joint declaration: „We are aware of our special role as stewards of Indonesia’s largest natural forests”.

Aceh and Papua: Conflict in the Forest

Aceh and Papua are often mentioned in the same breath when speaking about Indonesia’s conflict zones. The two regions are several thousand kilometres apart, but they have some things in common: Rich natural resources, a geo-politically important position and a long history of wars and independence dreams. Indonesia’s westernmost province, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, and the two Papuan provinces (Papua and Papua Barat) furthest to the east also have rights under Special Autonomy laws.

Aceh and Papua have a lot more in common: They harbour the last large connected rainforests in Indonesia. Those forests, however, are no longer intact. The conflicts exacted a heavy price from the forest. It is not at all true that the forests only exist because wars offer a certain protection, as some authors claim. Quite the opposite: In Aceh, both conflict parties financed their arms with tropical timber.

Both areas also share the fact that illegal logging has greatly increased in recent years, Since the 1990s, when Aceh was a military operations zone, forests are being mercilessly cut down. Following the tsunami, pressures on the forest have grown frighteningly. The forestry ministry has granted logging permissions to five companies „for the reconstruction of Aceh”. A large part of that timber never reached the areas affected by the tsunami but founds its way, via Medan and Malaysia and Singapore onto the word market. This is why the market in illegal construction timber from the Leuser ecosystem is blooming in neighbouring regions.

Papua has been favoured by an international timber mafia. Companies from all over South-east Asia and East Asia flog off tropical timber, in particular Merbau, to the 500 new timber factories in Hainan Province which in turn sell it on to most parts of the world. There is no doubt that the army in Papua cannot be overlooked amongst the players in the tropical timber business. There are multiple reasons for the abrupt start of the Run on Papua: Elsewhere in Indonesia, tropical forests have become almost a rarity. Decentralisation opened the door widely to an even more brutal destruction of forests. When China prohibited logging in its own territory, following the Yangtze flooding in 1998 (almost at the same time as Suharto’s resignation), they had to look abroad for supplies: To Papua, Russia and many other countries.

Right now, the strong demand for palm oil for bioenergy and diesel is the driving force behind the destruction of the forests. Fire is often used to clear the land. The Indonesian government is pursuing ambitious plans to supply the international agrofuel market, and Papua is to provide a large part of the required land. This means that five million hectares of Papua are to be converted to plantations for agrofuel feedstocks.

Every initiative for the protection of forests as globally important carbon sinks must logically include Aceh and Papua. The Indonesian forest policy has missed the opportunity for change and has not dared to point the finger to exactly those hotspots. The Ministry for Forests continues to kow-tow to the powerful logging industry and generously hands out licences. At the same time, they try to keep the mafia in check through policing methods. Rambo-style actions, however, can only scratch the surface, not stop the trend. International efforts such as the European FLEGT process and different bilateral agreements remain ineffective. How then can deforestation be stopped and a contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions be made?

Gobal Trade: Carbon dioxide

„This is brilliant – one protects the forest and gets even paid for it“, says a jubilant Bass Suebu. He has seen how forests can be protected in Costa Rica, a country which he visited from Mexico, where he was Indonesia’s ambassador. Costa Rica has had success in curbing deforestation, and is promoting its ‘Payments for Environmental Services’ as a model for other rainforest nations. In actual fact, Costa Rica’s success is based on a logging ban, together with payments for ‘avoided deforestation’ that are financed through an energy tax and international donations. They have been trying unsuccessfully to obtain carbon funding: The price at which carbon is being traded is not nearly high enough to meet the cost of their scheme. Nonetheless, Costa Rica have convinced other governments and politicians, including the Papuan Governor Bass Suebu, that the carbon markets could, in future, help to protect the world’s rainforests. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations was formed in 2005. 33 countries with tropical forests are members, including Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. It advocates a model based not on regulation or logging bans, but on payments financed largely through the carbon trade, something which would require an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. The governors of Papua, Aceh and Papua Barat strongly support this scheme. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations and their supporters, including many scientists, argue that the Kyoto Protocol contains a major flaw by failing to reward developing nations (non-Annex 1 countries) which protect their forests, even though deforestation is responsible for some 18% of greenhouse gas emissions and peat drainage for even more. The Kyoto Protocol allows industrialised ‘Annex 1’ nations to buy the right to emit more carbon dioxide by paying for projects in developing countries. This can include paying for monoculture timber plantations, classed as ‘afforestation’ and ‘reforestation’ projects (though so far only one such project has been approved under the Clean Development Mechanism), but it cannot involve protecting old-growth forests – even though a hectare of monoculture plantations stores at best a quarter of the carbon held in old-growth forests, and monocultures do not meet essential functions of natural forests, such as maintaining biodiversity, soils or the water cycle.

The call by the Coalition for Rainforest Nations that the protection of natural forests should be rewarded has therefore gained widespread support. During the United Nations climate conference in Bali this year, nations will debate about a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, which will expire in 2012. The proposal submitted by the Coalition for Rainforest Nations will be debated at the forthcoming UN climate conference in Bali, under the name „Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries’ (REDD). The World Bank will present their planned $250 million pilot project for protecting tropical forests, which is compatible with the REDD proposals.

The three governors, Suebu, Irwandi and Aturui can thus be optimistic that the international community will approve of their strategy for ‘avoiding deforestation’. The proclamation made during their Governors’ Roundtable might set a precedent for a possible resolution at Bali in December and might lead to a binding international agreement.

Within Indonesia, the three governors have a difficult position: Right after Suebu’s election as Governor of Papua in December 2006, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) called him for a meeting. SBY supports agrofuels (‘bio-diesel’) as the engine of the economic development. He hopes that investments in the plantation sector will create 3.5 million new jobs. The President demanded that Papua should immediately promise five million hectares of forest for conversion to oil palms and other plantations. Suebu was annoyed. He has enough problems with the timber companies holding logging concessions, their illegal activities and what he regards as the ‚backwardness’ of his people. According to well-informed sources he said „not with us”. Papua should not become like Kalimantan, where the forest will soon be gone and many animal species are becoming extinct. It is not known whether SBY was also angry. However, he reacted instantly. By January, a huge five-billion dollar deal was clinched with China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOP) and their Indonesian counter part, PT Sinar Mas Agro Resources (SMART). The plantations were to be established in Papua. Since then other companies have declared an interest. Some of them have already successfully acquired land with the support of Jakarta and of local district politicians.

Question: Ecology or economy?

What appears as a clear conflict between ecology and economy is far more: The governors of Papua themselves have grand plans for the development of West Papua. They also bank on economic development and compete with SBY in attracting investors. Fantastic ideas have been airs, of which even cities like Berlin or London could only dream, such as a ‘sky train’. Bupati (district heads) and other local politicians copy them. Development is to financed above all with the ‘green gold’ palm oil and for that the forest has to be cleared. At the same time, some politicians seem to have understood the arithmetic of the carbon trade in no time – not just a few bupati in Papua who suddenly sell their forests not to logging companies but to carbon dealers. The governor of Bengkulu has just returned from a rather spontaneous trip to the US where he offered his forest to people in the US for the price of $2.5 billion. It could pay off financially to demonstrate to the international community that one wants to protect the forest in order to contribute to the fight against climate change.

Torn between climate change and investment policies, attractive offers might move other Indonesian politicians to think again. In the long-term, what Nicholas Stern 1 said in his report on the economics of climate change: That climate change mitigation and economic growth and development do not have to compete with each other. This would solve the conflict become economy and ecology.

Greenpeace has calculated, based on emissions from peat soils in Kalimantan, that Indonesia could earn more from carbon trading than from converting peat forests into oil palm plantations. If one also considers that plantation companies are known to the Ministry of Finance as notorious tax evaders, the state could earn more from carbon trading than from the whole of the palm oil industry. But, of course, only as long as the forest still exists.

This is what a calculation similar to Greenpeace’s might look like for Papua: Provided that one million hectares are protected under the REDD model and every year 50,000 hectares are saved from clear-cutting, Papua could earn $50 to $100 million, based on a low price of $10 per tonne of carbon dioxide. This is a sum which even an economist will not dismiss. If more deforestation is avoided, or if the price per tonne of carbon is set higher, then the result would be even better. The avoidance strategy could become profitable.

If the example set by the ‚special autonomous provinces’ of Aceh and Papua gain support then truly huge sums of money will be on the table. Big sums of money lure big crooks. Just a few weeks after the Roundtable in April, obscure carbon traders appeared in Indonesia. Criminal activities and corruption are an acute threat to society, and without a functioning administration and a corruption-free political environment, the nice economic success could become rather one-sided.

Other unsolved problems are how the funding should be managed, what special training of provincial civil servants may be required and who should benefit from the money. Should it be the plantation companies, which need to forgo palm oil profits? Should it be the government budget which, under Indonesian law, owns the forest? Or the special autonomous provinces? Or should the money go to the indigenous peoples so that they can continue to live in harmony with nature and, through their way of living, sustain the forest? And how will they deal with the social and psychological effects of this sudden monetary gain within their villages and families?

This could backfire fort the environment, too. Biofuelwatch see a fundamental flaw in the concept about avoided emissions. The biosphere has a deficit in carbon sinks, because humans release 50% more carbon dioxide than can be sequestered by oceans and by forests and other ecosystems. Given that some ecosystems are on the verge of collapse, it is not enough to conserve percentages of the forests 2.

Attractive as the avoidance strategy might sound, it will only be possible to realise it for a small fraction of the forests. If deforestation can be avoided for one million hectares of Papuan forests, that means that the other nine million hectares of ‘conversion forest’, for which no finance mechanism is being negotiated, will not be spared from destruction. According to Biofuelwatch, that scenario is not the unfortunate side effect of an otherwise beautiful concept for saving climate and forest, but an integral component of the plans for dividing our planet.

Experiment Aceh: Moratorium

Anthropogenic emissions should actually be reduced. This would logically mean conserving the forests as carbon sinks. In practice, this would mean leaving the forest as it is and banning industrial logging. A logging moratorium gives the badly treated forest a breathing space. Furthermore, as Nicholas Stern calculates in his report, the costs for administering and controlling a logging bans are of an order of magnitude smaller than those of paying for environmental services through carbon trading. This would therefore be easier to finance and to realise for the world community.

Ecosystem Earth seems to be in a fragile condition and, in view of the already destroyed carbon sinks, a systemic approach is needed. Such an approach requires that the people who live in and from the forest play a key role as environmental protectors and should be honoured as such. Basic problems need to be addressed: Land rights, the lack of recognition for the economic and social rights of indigenous peoples, corruption, and the discrepancy between the excess capacities of the wood and paper industry and the insecure supplies.

Many interests, however, compete for the forest. Not only the local people want to assert their land rights – others also want to get hold of them. Diverse industries compete for land, the pulp and paper industry wants to expand, politicians try to attract investment into infrastructure. The state is in a no-win situation: It banks on economic growth and development but deprives future generations of the foundations for either through aggressive deforestation; it suffers enormous losses in taxes and payments, has to confront increasing land conflicts and has to manage ever more frequent catastrophes.

The forest law enforcement and certification models do not work, because the roots of the evil, the basic unsolved problems within Indonesia, are left untouched. Neither EU funding for Leuser National Park, nor the EU-FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) process have turned out to be suitable instruments for stopping rainforest destruction. FLEGT is restricted to voluntary agreements regarding the import of tropical hardwood into the EU and does not address growing demand in the consumer countries. Voluntary certification models offer nothing but an illusion of sustainability and often result in more rigorous clear-cutting elsewhere.

Aceh is a hotspot of the above mentioned problems and conflicts. Every year, Aceh loses around 20,000 hectares of forest. The contribution of illegal logging is high. According to the environmental NGO Walhi (Friends of the Earth Indonesia), 2.79 million cubic metres of forest were cut illegally in 2006 alone. Walhi estimate a loss of 260 million Euros, not including the costs of flooding, land slides and the ecological value of the forest. Only 2% of those huge quantities were recovered through police raids. The former GAM commander Irwandi has therefore put forest protection right at the top of his list of priorities right from his first days as Governor of Aceh. He has not shied away from personally taking part in actions against illegal loggers.

He has strong counter players. Forest Minister Kaban in Jakarta did not agree to lift the concessions for the five timber companies, quite the opposite: Jakarta exercises enormous pressure to free further forests for ‘conversion’. The government wants to increase the capacity of the pulp and paper industry in Sumatra and build new pulp mills in Kalimantan and Papua. Jakarta also sees potential for 120,000 hectares of oil palm plantations in the south and east of Aceh. The districts also plan the expansion of the timber industry and plantations – often one part of the state does not know what the other one is doing. The flow of information does not work, and the governor is facing opponents on all sides.

"Stand up for yourself” might have been Governor Irwandi’s motto when he opted for the initiative to conserve the tropical forests in Aceh and thus for a contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. During the Governors’ Roundtable, he promised to do what he could to protect the forest. Clear decisions were made.

Irwandi doesn’t regard the moratorium as the ultimate goal of his forestry policy. It is supposed to be a 15-year process with different stages, a breathing space in order to reform the forestry sector. A 15-year long break should give the government of Aceh time and space to address the existing conflicts around forest and land. Whether Irwandi can succeed in managing the conflicts with the powerful competing economic interests is a different issue.

During the first stage, no new concessions will be granted and an inventory will be taken. The legal status and the physical conditions of the forest will be examined. An independent agency is to carry out an audit, based on which existing concessions should be withdrawn, if the companies involved have exceeded the powers they were granted. The time is to be used to pass legislation to allow the use of confiscated, already cut timber and to allow for necessary imports. Eight months after the first phase, all logging in Aceh is to be stopped. Wood would only be allowed to come from plantations or community forests. A logging ban has to be accompanied by measures to reduce poverty and to strengthen social and economic rights. New jobs will have to be created, including for those people who currently work on timber plantations.

However the conflicts of interest will play out, Aceh and Papua are becoming actors on the international carbon market and will earn money in the process. What matters now is how Indonesia positions itself during the UN Climate Conference. This will show whether the rainforest ‘stewards’ will become real pioneers. <>

1. Nicholas Stern: Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change; October 2006/ http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm

2. 'Reduced Emissions From Deforestation': Can Carbon Trading Save Our Ecosystems? July 2007 http://www.biofuelwatch.org.uk/docs/Avoided_Deforestation_Full.pdf

Source : http://home.snafu.de/watchin/Index-engl.htm